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INTRODUCTION
Federalism is sometimes said to be an unstable halfway house
between unified national government and an alliance among separate
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
Carolyn S. G. Munro Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow of the Hoover
Institution, Stanford University.
We received very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article at a workshop held at the
California Institute of Technology, a Federalism symposium held at the Vanderbilt School of
Law, and at a conference on constitutionalism held at the Murphy Institute of Tulane
University. Jenna Bednar, Linda Cohen, Lance Davis, and Sanford Levinson provided especially cogent criticisms-some of which we have been able to cope with, thanks to the research
assistance of Jay Schiffman (New York University School of Law, 1993).
*
**
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sovereign states. This idea can be traced to a Hobbesian conception of
the state, according to which sovereignty must ultimately be indivisible: either national institutions retain the authority to make decisions or they do not. Genuine federal arrangements are unstable
under this perspective. The notion of indivisible sovereignty has a
powerful hold on our view of politics, but we think it is limited, most
importantly by its conflation of the question of where ultimate authority resides with the question of where state power is actually exerted.
While the answer to the first question is obviously significant, economic and sociological conceptions of politics suggest that the answer
to the second may tell much more about the nature of a polity.
Perhaps the main attraction of federalism in a country riven by
internal differences is that it permits foundational issues like the
location of sovereignty to be finessed, so that internal divisions can be
accommodated in ad hoc, practical ways. It permits people who may
differ greatly in their conception of a good public life to develop and
maintain their own separate communities within the context of a
larger and more powerful political economy, without requiring them
to surrender their separate identities.' Echoing Rawls, we view federalism as a political rather than a metaphysical solution to the for2
mation and maintenance of a state.
But if federalism is viewed in practical terms, it is not clear
that it has much bite. The standard view held by students of law and
politics is that the history of American federalism has been an inexorable series of moves in which national power has displaced state and
local power.3 According to this conventional wisdom, the triumph of
nationalism is seen everywhere-in election returns, in Congress, in
the Presidency, and especially in the courts-and it has been interrupted only occasionally by futile and anachronistic efforts to turn
back the clock (from the nullification controversies, through the Civil
War, up through tremors of a "new federalism" in the Nixon and
Reagan administrations). By the end of the New Deal, if not much
earlier, the states had become little more than administrative instrumentalities of the national government, helping to administer
1.

This view of federalism parallels the economists conception in which the value of

federal arrangements is that they permit subnational communities to decide autonomously

what the mix of public goods and taxes shall be, so that citizens may then sort themselves into
jurisdictions whose mixes they find attractive. In both views, it is important that the autonomy
of local governments be preserved.
2.
See generally John Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism(Columbia U., 1993).
3.
See sources cited in note 4-6.
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national programs and setting standards and regulations only at the
sufferance of national policy-making institutions. There is, in this account, nothing genuine or guaranteed about state sovereignty; it simply describes an historically convenient mode of public adminstration.
Various theories have been offered for this centralizing view of
American federalism. William Riker, for example, argues that genuine federal systems, because they are essentially based on concerns of
national security, tend to become centralized over time under the
pressure of foreign policy crises and successive military mobilizations.4 Paul Peterson presents a functional conception of federalism
that foresees policy specialization among national and subnational
governments, with day-to-day allocational (police power) duties and
developmental policies often taking place at the state or local levels,
and with redistributional policies being pressed to the national level. 5
Samuel Beer's historical conception of the foundations of the
American government locates ultimate sovereign authority in the
national electorate from the beginnings of constitutional history and
argues that the roles of states have always been instrumental and
contingent. 6 All of these theorists, and others we have not mentioned, espouse or assume a dynamic in which regulatory authority
7
seeps inexorably from the state to the national level.
While each of these theories was developed in the context of
American politics and history, each has relevance to federal institu4.
See generally William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Little,
Brown, 1964).
5.
Peterson offers a "demand side" theory that asserts that local and state governments
will be motivated to engage in developmental and allocative policies, and reluctant to pursue
progressive redistributions of wealth or income, whereas the national government may be able

to engage in redistributive policies. His conclusions about allocative and developmental policies
apply equally to the national government. Paul E. Peterson, City Limits ch. 4 (U. of Chicago,
1981).

6.

See generally Samuel H. Beer, To Make a Nation. The Rediscovery of American

Federalism(Harvard U., 1993).

7.

While each of these theories regards federal arrangements as unstable or provisional

in some sense, none of them is committed to a view that sees the national government as
inevitably growing larger or faster, or exercising more authority in fact, than the states.
Rather, each would say that under certain conditions--confronted by particular political circumstances--the dominance of national institutions either as a matter of fact or as a matter of
normative authority will become evident. It is possible, in principle, for each of the theories to

visualize a world in which federal arrangements are never subjected to the hard political circumstances that each posits as the motive force of nationalization (external threat, technical
change, internal division). However, it seems to us that Peterson and Beer believe that circumstances (for Peterson, lowered transactions and mobility costs; for Beer, increased public identification with the nation rather than the states) have in fact changed in ways that made domination by the national government inevitable. In Riker's case things are harder to decide since
it is not clear that security issues are much more threatening now than they were earlier in our
history.
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tions in settings outside the United States. If our experience teaches
that federalist arrangements are unstable and therefore only temporary-if they must eventually succumb either to nationalizing or centrifugal forces for any or all of the foregoing reasons-federalism's
potential as an institutional solution to various political conflicts
would be vastly reduced. After all, federalism's attraction in Canada,
South Africa, Russia and other former Soviet states, Nigeria, and
contemporary Western Europe is based on the fact that it promises to
leave significant arenas of decision to genuinely autonomous governmental units, while gaining the advantages (military and economic)
accruing to the formation of a national government. If behind such
promises of local autonomy is the certainty either that they will not be
fulfilled or that the advantages of nationhood will not be realized,
federalism would lose its power to settle political conflicts. In this
sense federalism has a problem of credibility.
One way the Framers of a constitution might address the
credibility problem is to vest the enforcement of federalism-based
promises in an independent judiciary having the power to invalidate
statutes as unconstitutional8 Unhappily, the legal literature insists
that this has not worked out in practice: the main constitutional law
casebooks emphasize the Supreme Court's inexorable transformation
of the Commerce Clause from a limitation on national power into a
limitation on state authority, 9 and leading scholars of constitutional
law treat challenges to exercises of national power as essentially
"nonjusticiable," that is, not enforceable by the judiciary. For example, Herbert Wechsler argues from James Madison's Federalist No. 46
that limitations on national power are "self-executing," enforced by
structural features of the national government that ensured protection of state autonomy through the normal political process.'0
Wechsler's argument has gained wide, even if not universal, acceptance among law professors."
8.
The power of judicial review was classically defended in Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton)
in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 464 (Mentor, 1961), and articulated by the
Supreme Court in Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9.
See, for example, Gerald Gunther, ConstitutionalLaw chs. 2-5 (Foundation, 12th ed.
1991); Daniel A. Farber, et al., ConstitutionalLaw: Themes for the Constitution'sThird Century
ch. 7 (West, 1993); Geoffrey R. Stone, et al., ConstitutionalLaw chs. 3-4 (Little, Brown, 2d ed.
1991). A notable exception is Paul Brest and Sanford Levinson, Processes of Constitutional
Decisionmakingchs. 1-5 (Little, Brown, 3d ed. 1992).
10. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism, in Herbert Wechsler,
Principles,Politics,and FundamentalLaw: Selected Essays 49 (Harvard U., 1961).
11 See, for example, Jesse H. Choper, JudicialReview and the National PoliticalProcess
171-259 (U. of Chicago, 1980).

1994]

ELASTIC COMMERCE CLAUSE

1359

The standard academic views about the history of federalismbased restraints on national power are extremely unsatisfying. To
begin with, the conclusions of the legal literature-that such restraints have not been enforced by the judiciary because they are best
left to the functional protections of normal politics-are inconsistent
with the conclusions of the political science literature-that for functional reasons normal politics would press toward ever-increasing
national regulation.12 Additionally, under either view, the anti-nationalists who acquiesced in the Constitution's ratification, and their
successors at other points in the nation's history, seem either foolish
(for believing the assurances of the Constitution's Framers) or politically inept (for being easily outmaneuvered at every turn by nationalists). While American history has its share of fools and bumblers,
compelling descriptive theories usually do not rest upon such assumptions. Finally, as we shall explore in this article, the Court's
Commerce Clause decisions have hardly shown a single-minded expansion of national power at the expense of state power. The Taney,
Fuller, and Taft Courts witnessed serious judicial efforts to limit
congressional power over state and local issues. These Supreme
Court decisions are inconsistent with the thesis that national power
will overwhelm state power. Although the conventional wisdom dismisses these cases as basically "overruled" by the New Deal, the New
Deal Court insisted that its expansion of national authority be accompanied by rules of statutory interpretation protecting concurrent state
authority as well. Also, the Rehnquist Court has struck down or narrowly construed national statutes on federalism grounds.
For these reasons, we seek to develop an alternative model of
American federalism. A robust federalism must maintain boundaries
between state and national authority by protecting the states against
invasions by national institutions, by protecting states from incursions by their neighbors, and by restraining states from transgression
on core national/constitutional values. Commerce Clause jurisprudence has been centrally concerned with these issues and is a natural
laboratory for the development of a federalist theory. Our account is
essentially structuralist: because the Court is politically vulnerable
to Congress and the President, it has rarely attempted to construe the
Commerce Clause to limit congressional authority. The circumstances when it has done so are marked by sharp ideological conflict
between the Court and Congress and have been at best temporary

12.

See sources cited in note 4-6.
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(and generally ad hoc) restraints on national power. However, just
because the Court has not actively restrained congressional actions
does not mean that Congress has been unrestrained. Indeed, the
various impediments to maintaining coherent legislative majorities
have proved very effective at limiting congressional adventures
against the states.
On the other hand, the Court has been much more active (and
principled) regulating state regulatory policies. It has usually protected the integrity of state government and state police power (i.e.,
policies protecting public health or safety or promoting economic
development) from being displaced by national regulation as long as
the exercise of these powers has not had substantial spillover effects,
either on nonresidents or on important constitutional values. But if
there is strong evidence that a state is pursuing a policy that pushes
costs onto nonresidents, the Court has not been reluctant either to set
aside the state laws or authorize congressional action. This theme is
consonant with the Framers' understanding that states would be the
primary engines of what Paul Peterson has called "developmental"
policies (policies aimed at improving the state economy) and
"allocative" policies (traditional police powers, the day-to-day operation of state services).
Our Article will develop the foregoing thesis in three stages.
First, we shall develop from the political science literature a theoretical model that predicts how an independent but nonetheless political
Supreme Court would enforce the Constitution's federalist structure.
The predictions of our model will then be tested and supplemented by
a brief history of the Court's federalism precedents. The history will
be organized around the major ideological shifts in American public
life (1828, 1860, 1896, 1932, and possibly 1980). The Article will conclude with a refined version of our model, one that takes account of
the complexities suggested by our constitutional history.
I. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERALISM

This Part develops a dynamic model of judicial enforcement of
federalism norms. At the outset we should articulate our assumptions about each feature. We take "federalism norms" to be the
Framers' general goals in dividing authority between national and
state governments. On the one hand, national authority would be
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limited by the usefulness of keeping most regulation localized; 13 on the
other hand, state regulation would be limited by the Framers' desire
to avoid the balkanization characteristics of the Articles of
Confederation. 14 We take 'Judicial enforcement" to involve not just
the application of the federalism norms held by members of the Court,
but also to involve the Justices' other preferences, including their
substantive preferences as- to the policy under review and their
institutional preferences. Ours is a "dynamic moder' in that it
contemplates variation both in judicial political preferences and in
judicial fidelity to federalism norms through diverse political eras of
American history. These are our assumptions in a nutshell. We now
elaborate on them.
A JudicialPreferencesBased on Rule of Law, Political,
and InstitutionalValues
We assume that political officials, including federal judges,
have and act upon preferences about ultimate policy outcomes.1 5
Judicial policy preferences, in our account, reflect the views of the
political coalitions responsible for their appointments, and are therefore sensitive to presidential and congressional policy preferences and
indirectly to electoral judgments. Of course, at a particular moment,
the policy preferences of those judges sitting on the Supreme Court
may be out of phase with those held by other political leaders or by
the electorate; because different political coalitions are responsible
for the appointment of different Justices, at any given point in time
the Court is likely to have an array of different preferences.
While judges (like other political actors) have ideologies or
policy preferences, their preferences are also much influenced by their
institutional circumstances. In particular, we believe that judges
typically hold what might be termed rule of law, and institutional
13. The Framers believed that national power would be limited to those powers enumerated or delegated to it in Articles I-III. See U.S. Const., Amend. X
14. This value is not set forth explicitly in the Constitution, but apparently was contemplated by at least some of the Framers. See, for example, Letter from James Madison to J.C.
Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), reprinted in Max Farrand, 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of
1787 at 478 (Yale U., 1937). See also H.P Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
15. For well-considered and typical examples, see Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern
Mind (Brentano's, 1947); Walter F. Murphy, Elements of JudicialStrategy (U. of Chicago, 1964);
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 505-07 (Little, Brown, 3d ed. 1986); Jeffrey A.
Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge U.,
1993); Robert A. Dahl, Decision Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy.-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279 (1957); Glendon A. Schubert, The Study of Judicial DecisionMaking as an Aspect of PoliticalBehavior, 52 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1007 (1958).
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preferences, in addition to policy preferences. For professional as well
as historical reasons, the Court sees its primary role in American
government to enforce the rule of law-obedience to the Constitution
and duly enacted statutes and treaties of the United States. Where a
legal rule is clearly applicable to an issue, the Court will be inclined to
follow and apply it.
Even the most optimistic legal theories of the Court realize
that it will also protect its own institutional interests and standing.
Federal courts are politically vulnerable institutions that have
powerful reasons to be cautious in imposing restrictions on the other
branches of the national government. Thus, institutional prudence by
itself would make judges reluctant to attempt to curb congressional
initiatives, at least those that emerge with significant sustained
majorities. While this form of judicial restraint could seem craven
and unprincipled, it is consistent with a commitment to what we shall
call democracy norms16-norms that assert that the Court should
leave undisturbed legislative actions in which all affected parties were
more or less adequately represented in the enacting legislature. Such
a normative belief grounds the presumption of deference to
legislatures on a broader commitment to constitutional values by
assuming on evidence of formal respresentation that adequate
procedural protection was available to concerned parties.
Democracy norms, insofar as they are held to apply to legislatures generally and not merely to Congress, permit a wide scope of
subnational governments to pursue policies of interest to their own
residents so long as such activities do not trespass too blatantly on
the interests of their neighbors. By presumptively allowing those,
and only those, whose interests are directly affected by a policy to
make choices about it, democracy norms also permit the attainment of
economically efficient outcomes. Thus we may see that a judicial
commitment to democracy may provide additional support for an
independently attractive efficiency norm.
B. Democracy and Efficiency Norms
While we argue that a commitment to democracy is functional
for the Court, part of its attraction is that it can be seen to emerge
from the American political tradition. Democracy norms may be
16. For an elaboration of widely held normative expectations at the time of the founding,
see generally David F. Epstein, A Political Theory of The Federalist(U. of Chicago, 1985).
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traced to the centrality of consent in the American political tradition,
to the Declaration of Independence's demand for representation as a
precondition for cost imposition, or to structural features of the
Constitution. 1' Each of these sources points to a commitment to the
use of elections to protect fundamental interests. Each supports the
view that, for the most part, citizens can use electoral processes to
defend their interests without judicial intervention, but that those
without adequate representation might need additional protection.
While these expectations are quite general, two classes of vulnerable
interests have special claims to judicial assistance: those unrepresented in the governmental unit making decisions that affect their
interests (this problem arises from the federal organization of government), and those groups that are specially disadvantaged in the
exercise of their political rights.18
From the perspective of democracy norms, congressional uses
of the Commerce Clause would seem to need little judicial scrutiny
(except where adverse effects fall disproportionately on politically
disadvantaged groups), because the states and other interests are
presumably represented in Congress. On the other hand, state and
local regulations affecting interstate commerce would require regular
judicial oversight to restrain local temptations to exploit outsiders (for
example, the United States, other states, businesses located in other
jurisdictions) who are not well-represented in the state political process. In other words, while restrictive readings of the Commerce
Clause ought to be exceptional, restrictions on the states pursuant to
the dormant Commerce Clause ought to be common and even increase
as the the fall in transportation costs makes cost exporting easier to
accomplish.
In the context of Commerce Clause adjudication, efficiency
norms entail the presumption that states ought to be left free to formulate their own allocative and developmental policies, insofar as the
effects of these policies are confined to the jurisdiction. When such
policies create significant spillovers, either by pushing costs onto

17. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of JudicialReview (Harvard
U., 1980). See also Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent (Yale U., 1975); Choper,
JudicialReview (cited in note 11).
18. Both ideas have been articulated by Justice Harlan Stone in his opinions in United
States v. CaroleneProducts Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) and South CarolinaState Highway
Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938). See generally David M. Bixby, The
Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights: Another Look at United States v.
Classic, 90 Yale L. J. 741 (1981). But we argue that these democracy concerns underlie our
whole constitutional tradition.
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outsiders or by trespassing on significant national values or policies,
the presumption that state action would lead to efficient outcomes
would fail, and judicial oversight may be required.
With respect to state redistributive policies, matters are more
complicated. Paul Peterson has argued that individuals and firms
have significant locational motivations that work against the efficacy
of progressive redistribution at the subnational level: beneficiaries
will tend to migrate in and payers will tend to migrate out of a jurisdiction pursuing such policies, thus impoverishing such jurisdictions
and undermining the policies themselves. 19 Thus, if mobility costs are
small, state and local governments may find it difficult to achieve
progressive redistributions of wealth, even if their citizens wish to do
so. Thus, courts would seldom need to restrain states from progressive redistributions. On the other hand, when factor mobility is restricted so that genuine redistributive effects are achievable, courts
will sometimes have occasion to restrain state actions.
C. A Model of Supreme Court Enforcement of Federalism
Combining these three features of judicial preferences (rule of
law, policy, and the norms of democracy and efficiency), we may
sketch out an elementary model of judicial enforcement of federalism.
Our model is a twin model, with different predictions for national
regulation than for state regulation.
We start with national regulation. We expect federal authority
to be exercised most often for redistributive policies or for developmental policies where there is a need for a national and uniform response (as to emergencies), where state-by-state regulation tends to
yield spillover effects or externalities, or where interstate competition
for economic development yields a "race to the bottom." Federal
authority is least necessary for basic allocational policies, such as
regulation of marriage and families, health and personal safety, morals (including torts and basic crimes), contractual relationships,
agency and corporate relationships, and so forth.
This typology provides a more formal way of expressing the
rule of law values implicated by federalism and the limited nature of
national authority: Localized allocational policies are presumptively
off limits to national regulation, but that presumption can be offset by
a showing that one of the reasons for national jurisdiction (uniform
19.

Peterson, City Limits at 69-72, 79 (cited in note 5).
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response, inteijurisdictional externalities, race to the bottom) exists.
There is no presumption as to developmental policies, but they must
be rationally related to one of the national justifications. The purpose
of these requirements is to preserve the states' primacy over
developmental and (especially) allocational policies; a corollary of that
primacy is that the national government must not be allowed to
undermine state governments themselves, for that would by necessity
undermine the states' abilities to accomplish their primary functions.
In contrast, redistributive policies are presumptively best left to
national regulation and present no constitutional problems-unless
they fall athwart political or constitutional norms valued by a particular Court.
We would not expect the Court to strike down national redistributions on democratic theory grounds, because of the relative
openness of the federal electoral system and the representation of
most interests in Congress.20 Efficiency norms, however, may provide
reasons to oppose national legislation, on the grounds that the incidence of benefits and costs may provide political incentives to subsidize some interests rather than others. 21 But, under the presumption
that cost-paying groups have political access to the legislature, courts
should be disposed to give wide latitude to federal action in such
cases. Whether such concerns are triggered is closely connected to the
relative political ideologies of the enacting Congress and the Court.
Our working hypothesis is that a federal redistribution is most vulnerable when it is enacted by a Congress composed of a different and
competing political coalition than that which appointed a majority of
the Supreme Court reviewing the legislation.
This point can be crudely illustrated by reference to the
"critical elections" thesis. 22 Under that thesis, the elections of 1828,
1860, 1896, 1932, and (possibly) 1980 involved large-scale political
realignments, in which the nation voted for a new coalition and that
coalition's solution of the big problems bedeviling the prior period.
20. Our caveat about statutes hurting unrepresented minorities is much less severe at the
national level than the state level, it is not a theme that is prominent for most of the Court's
history, and it is not a theme much associated with the "federalism" cases. Hence our subsequent discussion will minimize this factor.
21. The classic example is the case in which the benefits of a federal program accrue to
small, well-organized interests while the costs are spread widely through the tax system.
22. See generally Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of
American Politics(Norton, 1970); V.O. Key, A Theory of CriticalElections, 17 J. Pol. 3 (1955), as
well as Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 795
(1975); Thomas Jahnige, CriticalElections andSocial Change: Towards a Dynamic Explanation
of NationalPartyCompetition in the United States, 3 Polity 465 (1971).
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After a time lag (except in one case, 1896), each critical election also
yielded a realignment on the Supreme Court. We would expect that
during the lag period the "old" Court would be most willing to overturn the "new" Congress' redistributive policies, but that after the
realignment had occurred the new Justices would presumptively defer
23
to the political coalition that put them on the Court.
We illustrate some of the predictions of this simple theory in
Table One.
Table One
Predicted Court Holdings on National Power Cases

Court
Ideology
Near that of
Enacting
Congress

Court
Ideology
Different
From Enacting
Congress

Core

no

invalid

State
Functions

prediction

igh
Burden on

Low
Burden on
Core
State
Functions

uphold

probably
invalid

23. We emphasize that the deference is not because the new Justices made any illicit
promises to the appointing President or confinming Senators, or even because they were grilled
on the issues of concern to the governing coalition (though any of these things may go on). The
deference grows out of the political values the new Justices share with those who appoint and
confirm them.
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Our theory provides reasons to believe that that the Court will
be more prone to strike down state or local, rather than national,
regulation on grounds of federalism. This is so in part because the
Court is more likely to diverge ideologically from any given state
legislature than it is from Congress, given the political or ideological
variability among the states. Moreover, the Court needs the cooperation of Congress to accomplish many of its goals (especially the
smooth functioning of the federal judiciary as a whole) and has more
to fear from Congress than from state legislatures: Congress can
impeach justices, tinker with their pensions, refuse to increase judicial salaries to keep pace with inflation, enlarge the size of the Court,
arbitrarily add to the Court's workload, leave lower court vacancies
unfilled, fiddle with federal jurisdiction, and so forth.
The most important reason for greater scrutiny of state and
local legislation is that such laws are more likely to impose external
costs on people not well-represented in the state or local political
process. This phenomenon not only poses efficiency problems, but
also directly implicates the anti-balkanization value that gave rise to
the Constitution. Concern for democratic process values should also
make judges suspicious of state and local distributive policies that
impact heavily on outsiders, or that are especially impervious to
change by those who bear their costs. Such policies might seem especially likely to emanate from the capture of local political processes by
powerful minorities and to warrant federal intervention on representation reinforcement grounds. In short, when cost-exporting state
legislation appears to be an effort to redistribute wealth from state
outsiders to state insiders and the local political process seems unable
to correct the defect (as will typically be the case), we predict the
Supreme Court will be most likely to invalidate the state effort. 24
Conversely, the Justices will tend to be tolerant of state and
local allocative and developmental policies insofar as their benefits
and costs fall largely within the jurisdiction. The policies are executed and financed by the people whose welfare is directly affected,
and therefore democratic incentives are well-placed to ensure relatively efficient results. Hence, the Court can be expected to permit
these governments ample discretion in pursuing such ends. 5 Table
24. The cost.exporting theory is developed by Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 125. See also Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 Const. Comm. 395 (1986).
25. This treatment leaves aside the issue of whether state political structures are particu.
larly likely to reach efficient outcomes even when the costs and benefits are entirely internal to
the jurisdiction.
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Two presents predictions for the Court's handling of federalism attacks on state laws under the dormant Commerce Clause and other
provisions.
Table Two
Predicted Court Holdings on State Power Cases

Allocative
or
Development

Redistributive
Policy

Policy

Large
External
Effects
Not
Corrected

not clear

invalid

uphold

not
clear (depends
on ideology)

Modest or
Corrigible
External
Effects

The predictions in Table Two rest strongly on the presumption
that states and localities should be permitted wide discretion in executing polcies whose effects are confined to their own residents and
which do not implicate constitutional values. When either prong of
this test fails-as on the diagonal cells-the Court will resort to balancing considerations and the theory will not have strong predictions.
We now turn, in the remainder of the article, to provide a brief history
of federalism adjudication as a prelude to providing an evaluation of
the theory.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERALISM AT THE SUPREME COURT
In this Part, we trace the Supreme Court's federalism cases
through history, as a means of testing and perhaps refining the hypotheses set forth in Tables One and Two. For ease of exposition, we
follow critical elections theory to organize our discussion of the
Court's decisions. The exposition does not pretend to be comprehensive but does touch upon the federalism decisions that are considered
the major ones by the leading texts and general treatises on constitu-

tional law.26
A

The Marshall Court, 1801-35

In light of the nation's experience under the Articles of
Confederation, there was a consensus after the adoption of the
Constitution that the federal government should be able to exercise
national authority to facilitate a national market. The Supreme
Court reflected this consensus, under the leadership of Chief Justice
John Marshall (1801-35), prominently seconded by Justices William
Johnson (1804-34) and Joseph Story (1811-45).27 The Court's federalism decisions in this period relentlessly pursued this developmental
objective, but without violating the original promise that state governments would be left free to follow local developmental policies.
The leading case was Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden,28
which struck down a New York law requiring a license to operate
steamboats between New York City and New Jersey, on the ground
that the license was inconsistent with a federal statute regulating
"ships and vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisher26. For texts, see Brest and Levinson, Processesof ConstitutionalDecisionmaking (cited in
note 9); Gunther, ConstitutionalLaw at chs. 2-5, 10 (cited in note 9); Stone, ConstitutionalLaw
at chs. 2-3 (cited in note 9). For general treatments, see Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of
American Law (Simon & Schuster, 2d ed. 1985); Paul L. Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis
Times, 1918-1969 (Harper, 1972); Leonard W. Levy, Kenneth L. Karst, and Dennie J. Mahoney,
eds., Encyclopedia of the American Constitution (Macmillan, 1986).
27. Marshall and his original Court were Federalists appointed by Presidents Washington
and Adams. The election of 1800 brought a quarter century of Democrat-Republican Presidents,
but Presidents Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe favored a strong national presence, and the
Justices they appointed (such as Johnson and Story) reflected those views.
On the Marshall Court generally, see George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson,
Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-1815 (Macmillan, 1981) (vol. 2 of the Oliver
Wendall Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States); G. Edward White,
The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-1835 (Oxford, 1991) (vols. 3 & 4 of the Holmes
Devise History); Leonard W. Levy, Marshall Court (1801-1835), in Levy, et al., 3 Encyclopedia of
the American Constitution 1211 (cited in note 26).

28.

22 U.S. (9 Wheaton) 1 (1824).
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ies.' ' 29 Though the New York licensee argued that the New York regu-

lation was merely an exercise of traditional state police power,
Marshall responded that such exercise must give way to the national
government's superior authority to regulate interstate commerce.
From a development perspective, state-by-state regulation of the
interstate coastal trade is inefficient, risking the sort of prisoner's
dilemma games that had bedevilled the country under the Articles of
Confederation. Under our theory, Gibbons is an easy affirmance of
national power, because the national statute reflected the same political values as those held by the Court, and the development policy
reflected in the statute was justified by the need for national uniformity and the avoidance of prisoners' dilemmas. Gibbons is less easy but
also supportable as an invalidation of state power (developmental
function but with large external costs), and the Court left open the
possibility of state regulation of the coastal trade when it declined to
adopt Justice Johnson's argument that the existence of national
power negated the possibility of state regulation.30
Two other decisions considerably broadened federal regulatory
authority; both are only slightly harder cases than Gibbons under our
model. Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland3' upheld
Congress' chartering of the second United States Bank, even though
there was no explicit constitutional authorization. The opinion argued that the creation of the Bank was "necessary and proper" for the
implementation of other powers delegated to Congress in Article I.
Marshall then invalidated Maryland's effort to tax the Bank, as inconsistent with the exercise of national sovereignty. This is a harder
case under our model, because the chartering of banks was a traditional state function. But Marshall characterized the national bank
as needed for national development, and this Federalist policy was
one with which the Marshall Court was thoroughly sympathetic.
Hence, McCulloch goes in the same lower righthand quadrant as
Gibbons, where national power will be affirmed.
In Swift v. Tyson,32 the Court held that federal courts in diversity cases should decide commercial law issues by reference to "the

29. Id. at2.
30. Id. at 222-39 (Johnson, J., concurring).
31. 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 316 (1819).
32. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). This case was decided during the Taney Court, but the opinion was
written by Story and reflected Marshall Court themes. Also, Story's opinion rested upon an
interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789, but the themes were clearly those of constitutional
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general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence," rather
than the "decisions of the local [state] tribunals," thereby federalizing
the law of commerce (generally) and negotiable instruments (the issue
in Swift).3 3 We consider this a hard case, because contract regulation
was and remains an essentially allocative state function. The Court
obviously viewed the federalization of contract law as desirable for
national economic development, and the Court was politically sympathetic to this regime. Hence Swift fits our model well enough, though
it is in the more ambiguous quadrant right above the GibbonsMcCulloch quadrant. That Swift was an invasion of traditional state
functions rendered it more vulnerable than the earlier precedents,
moreover. When the Court grew less concerned with federalization of
contract law, and especially when the Court realized that Swift had
not produced the uniformity Justice Story had hoped for, the Court
overruled the case in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.34 The later case
explicitly relied on federalism concerns as the basis for its overruling,
and Erie securely fits in the upper righthand quadrant of our national
regulation table-the quadrant suggesting the invalidity of national
regulations that invade traditional state functions and that represent
political values the Court does not favor.
The Marshall Court applied the national powers enumerated
in Article I very broadly but was not insensitive to the need to recognize breathing room for state and local regulation, especially when it
did not have spillover effects on other citizens. Thus, Marshall in
Gibbons flirted with but did not adopt Johnson's philosophy of "dual
federalism," under which the states were prohibited from regulating
any issue which fell under the national authority to regulate interstate commerce. 35 Strict enforcement of dual federalism by a Court
expanding national authority would have been a significant retreat
from the theory of federalism as we have articulated it. Marshall
implicitly rejected Johnson's theory in Willson v.Black Bird Creek
Marsh Co.,36 upholding a state authorization for the company to build
a dam across a navigable river. Marshall upheld the law against a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge, on the ground that the state
law served valid economic and health purposes and did not clash with
federalism and an instrumental view of the common law. See Grant Gilmore, The Ages of
American Law 34 (Yale U., 1977).

33.

Swift, 41 U.S. at 16.

34. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
35. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 222-39 (Johnson, J., concurring). Marshall's opinion flirted
with dual federalism but found it unnecessary to the decision in the case.
36. 27 U.S. 245 (1829).
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any enacted congressional law or policy. 37 This is consistent with our
theory, for the state regulation in Black Bird Creek was a developmental one with few apparent effects external to the state. Note that
Marshall was more open to a dual federalism argument in Gibbons,
where the state regulation fits in the upper lefthand quadrant of our
state regulation table (result unclear), than he was in Black Bird
Creek, where the state regulation fits in the lower lefthand quadrant
(always uphold). Also notably, Johnson advanced his thesis of federal
exclusivity in a concurring opinion in the former case but silently
joined Marshall's opinion in the latter.
The Marshall Court's most controversial federalism decisions
were those which regulated state redistribution of "property." Under
the Contract Clause, the Court held in Dartmouth College v.
Woodward,3s that New Hampshire could not unilaterally modify a
private college's charter to regulate it. Generally, the Marshall Court
was leery of retroactive state regulation of private contracting, 9 but
this was on the whole an issue that divided the Court. Also divisive
was the issue of slavery, which became especially prominent on the
national agenda in 1819, when Missouri petitioned for statehood as a
slave state. Marshall and Story considered slavery "repugnant to the
general principles of justice and humanity,"4 and Johnson's anti-slavery views impelled him to invalidate a South Carolina statute requiring the internment of any "person of color" arriving at a South
Carolina port. 41 On the whole, and perhaps reflecting divisions within
its nationalizing coalition, the Marshall Court did not stake out
strong positions on Contract Clause and slavery issues, leaving them
for the next generation of judges.

37. Id. at 251. The economic purpose was to allow development along the creek banks.
The health purpose was to draw off '"pestilence" resulting from the slow-moving creek. Id. at
249.
38. 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 518 (1819).
39. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (6 Cranch) (1810) (holding that Georgia could not
rescind public land sale allegedly entered into by bribery); Sturges v. Crowninshield,17 U.S. (4
Wheaton) 122 (1819) (holding that New York bankruptcy law cannot retroactively discharge a
debt), explained in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheaton) 213 (1827).
40. United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551)
(Story, sitting as circuit judge). See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheaton) 66 (1825) (Marshall,
C.J.).
41. Elkison v. Deliesseline,8 F. Cas. 493, 493 (C.C.D.S.C.) (No. 4,366) (1823) (Johnson, J.,
sitting on the circuit).
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B. The Taney Court, 1836-65
The election of Andrew Jackson as President in 1828 and 1832
represented a realignment in American politics, and the Jacksonian
period that followed can be characterized as one in which organized
parties became important for the first time, economic development
was on the whole left to the states (Jackson vetoed bills seeking to
renew the U.S. Bank and to spend money to create interstate transportation networks), and the states were left free to deal with issues
of slavery.42 Jackson and his successor Martin Van Buren (the father
of the modern party system) remade the Court with the appointments
of eight Justices, including Chief Justice Roger Taney. 43
Because the national government in this era did not pursue
development or redistributive projects, the Taney Court was not
called upon to apply or rethink the Marshall Court's expansive vision
of national authority, but it was constantly asked to resolve issues
arising out of the "dormant" features of the Commerce Clause. The
Court generally allowed the states to pursue local development objectives, even in cases where the Marshall Court might have considered
those objectives to have trenched upon national authority or private
property rights. The most striking example was Mayor of the City of
New York v. Miln,44 an early Taney Court decision which upheld a
New York law screening immigrants coming into the state from overseas and barring entry of immigrants the mayor felt were likely to
become dependent upon the city. Although this regulation operated
as a localized immigration policy, the Court (rather remarkably) held
that it was a police law rather than a regulation of interstate commerce. Relying on Gibbons, only Story (a holdover from the Marshall
Court) dissented. The Court distinguished Gibbons as a case in which
"the theatre on which the law operated was navigable water," over
which national regulation was paramount, while the new case in42. On the Jackson era, see generally Carter Goodrich, Government Promotion of
American Canals and Railroads, 1800-1890 (Columbia U., 1960); Richard P. McCormick, The
Second American PartySystem: PartyFormationin the JacksonianEra (U. of N.C., 1966).
43. The Jackson Democrats appointed to the Court by these Presidents were John
McLean of Ohio (1829), Henry Baldwin of Pennsylvania (1830), James Wayne of Georgia (1835),
Roger Taney of Maryland (1836), Philip Barbour of Virginia (1836), John Catron of Tennessee
(1837), John McKinley of Kentucky (1837), and Peter Daniel of Virginia (1841). Note that six
(the last six) of the eight were from slave-holding states.
On the Taney Court and federalism, see Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause Under
Marshall, Taney, and Waite (U. of N.C., 1937); Carl B. Swisher, The Taney Period, 1836-1864
(MacMillan, 1974) (vol. 5 of the Holmes Devise History); R. Kent Newmyer, Taney Court (18361864), in Levy, et al., 4 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 1867 (cited in note 26).
44. 36 U.S. 102 (1837).
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volved only "the territory of New York over which the state possesses
an acknowledged, an undisputed jurisdiction for every purpose of
internal regulation. 45 Under our state regulation model, Miln is an
unclear case (consistent with the Court's internal division), because
the local regulation clearly had external effects but was apparently a
local developmental policy. Whether such a regulation would be
upheld depends on the Court's political values, which is why we suggest the Marshall Court might have reached a different result and
why the current Court would surely do so.
The suggestion in Miln that potential national authority to
regulate an issue does not automatically preclude state regulation
46
was the basis for the Court's holding in Cooley v. Board of Wardens.
The Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute requiring vessels entering
and leaving the port of Philadelphia to engage local pilots to guide
them through the harbor. Consistent with Gibbons (though not citing
it), the Court held that Congress had the authority to regulate pilots
under the Commerce Clause, but reasoned that the states could exercise concurrent jurisdiction unless the "subjects of this power are in
their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system. ''47
Although Cooley was not the Court's last word on the subject, it was a
landmark decision rejecting a broad (Johnson) reading of Gibbons to
constrict the authority of the states as the national authority expanded or became better defmed.48 Under our model, Cooley is an
easier case than either Gibbons or Miln, because the local regulation
was an allocational one (safety) and had modest external effects-thereby placing it in the same quadrant as Black Bird Creek,
the lower lefthand side of our state regulation table.
Consistent with the Jacksonian political agenda and its general willingness to accommodate state regulation under the dormant
Commerce Clause, the Taney Court also applied the Contract Clause
with some leniency in evaluating state developmental programs. The

45. Id. at 135. The Court also observed that there had been a direct clash of national and
state laws, while in the new case federal laws did not reach the situation regulated by New
York.
46. 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
47. Id. at 319. The Court also observed that Congress had not legislated directly on the
subject, and that the most relevant federal statute evidenced a congressional intent to leave this
area to the states. Id. at 317-18.
48. See also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421 (1855) (holding,
by a divided Court, that Congress can authorize the state to regulate a matter lying in interstate commerce).
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leading case was Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,49 where the
Court (again over Story's lone dissent) rejected Harvard College's
Contract Clause challenge to the state's building a bridge across the
Charles River, which effectively destroyed the value of Harvard's
ferry franchise. Taney's opinion for the Court did not retreat from the
Marshall Court's cases prohibiting retrospective abrogation of contract rights, but it did set forth a more liberal rule for construing
public grants: "any ambiguity in the terms of the contract, must operate against the adventurers, and in favor of the public."50 Like the
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, its Contract Clause jurisprudence was friendly to state development programs. 51 On federalism grounds, CharlesRiver is an easy case to uphold (developmental
policy, no exterhal effects).
The Jackson-appointed Justices achieved a substantial amount
of consensus on the issues discussed above, but they fragmented on
the issue of slavery-at the same time the Democrat and Whig parties
were similarly fragmenting, in the 1850s. Taney as early as 1842 had
staked out a strong states-rights position on the slavery issue, in
which he interpreted the Constitution to give slave states wide berth
to maintain and protect their institution, as through fugitive slave
laws supplementing the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.52- But his
Court broke wide open on the issue in Dred Scott v. Sandford.53 The
Court dismissed the lawsuit of Dred Scott, a Missouri slave seeking
freedom based upon his and his master's residence in the free state of
Illinois and in the congressionally created free territory north of
Missouri. Taney's opinion reasoned, in part, that the Missouri
Compromise of 1820, which created the free territory, was
unconstitutional, both because Article I did not specifically authorize
it and because it operated as an unlawful "taking" of the master's
M
"property" when he brought Scott into the free territory.5
The
49. 36 U.S. 420 (1837). See generally Stanley Kutler, Privilege and Creative Destruction:
The Charles River Bridge Case (Lippincott, 1971).
50. 36 U.S. at 544.
51. See also West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507 (1848). But see Benjamin F.
Wright, The Contract Clause of the Constitution 62-63 (Harvard U., 1931) (emphasizing the
continuities between the Marshall and Taney courts).
52. Priggv. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 626 (1842) (Taney, J., concurring in the judgment,
but not in the opinion for the Court by Story, J.) (invalidating Pennsylvania statute punishing
slaveholders who forcibly recovered their escaped slaves in Pennsylvania). See Ableman v.
Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859) (Taney, C.J.) (holding that Wisconsin state court could not issue writ
of habeas corpus to free a federal prisoner convicted of violating the Fugitive Slave Act).
53. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). See generally Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, Its
Significance in American Law and Politics(Oxford U., 1978).
54. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 432-52 (opinion of the Court by Taney, C.J.).
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opinion also ruled that federal courts had no diversity jurisdiction to
hear the case, because African Americans were not "citizens" within
Article III's authorization of federal jurisdiction. 55 Six Justices (four
of them from the South) wrote separate concurring opinions, differing
in various ways with Taney's analysis. Two (Northern) Justices
dissented and would have granted Scott relief. That Dred Scott was a
hard case for the Court is consistent with our model of national
regulation: The federal legislation was redistributive legislation, but
it was politically offensive to a Southern-dominated Court. Hence the
statute fits in the lower righthand quadrant of the national regulation
table, which yields no clear prediction.
C. The ReconstructionCourt, 1865-95
The Court's decision in Dred Scott precipitated the nation's
greatest crisis of federalism. 56 In the election of 1860, the Republican
candidate, Abraham Lincoln, won on a platform vowing to overturn
the decision, and Southern states promptly "seceded" from the union.
The Civil War was fought over their right to withdraw, and the seceders lost. The Party of Lincoln governed the country continuously
(with the exception of the two Presidencies of Grover Cleveland) for
the next two generations and filled the Court with Republicans to
replace the Taney Court. 57 The Lincoln platform was strikingly different from the Jacksonian one of the previous period, emphasizing
the role of the national government in economic development (through
railroad land grants, for example) and in redistributing social power
(ultimately favoring the abolition of slavery and the badges of servitude it imposed).

55. Id. at 452-54.
56. See generally Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution (Harper &
Row, 1988); James G. Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln (U. of Illinois, 1964);
Kenneth M. Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Knopf, 1965); Arthur Bestor, The
American Civil War as a ConstitutionalCrisis,69 Am. Hist. Rev. 327 (1964).
57. Lincoln himself appointed five Justices, Chief Justice Salmon Chase (1864-73) and
Associate Justices Noah Swayne (1862-81), Samuel Miller (1862-90), David Davis (1862-77), and
Stephen Field (1863-97). Other notable appointments of the era were Joseph Bradley (1870-92)
and John Harlan (1877-1911) as Associate Justices and Morrison Waite (1874-88) as Chief

Justice.
On the Reconstruction Court generally, see Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion,
1864-88 (MacMillan, 1971) (vols. 6 & 7 of the Holmes Devise History); William W. Wiecek,
Chase Court (1864-1873), in Levy, et al., eds., 1 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 234
(cited in note 26).
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A political coalition of radical abolitionists decisively won the
election of 1866, and that mandate ensured the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1868.58 This and the

other Reconstruction measures dramatically altered the balance of
Unlike the pre-Civil War
federalism in the United States.
Constitution, whose first ten amendments provided rights enforceable
against the national government, the Constitution after
Reconstruction provided rights for citizens enforceable against the
states. This was an important move, whose unfolding we explore
below, but we should emphasize also that the Reconstruction Court
was cognizant of the need to preserve a strong role for continuing
state autonomy in the face of new national economic and civil rights
policies. Hence it was the Reconstruction Court that extended
McCulloch's assertion of federal immunity from state taxation to create a reciprocal state immunity against federal taxation in Collector v.
Day.59 As Chief Justice Salmon Chase put it, "the preservation of the
States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much
within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of
the Union and the maintenance of the National government."60
The former abolitionists who had presided over Reconstruction
were pretty much united on the proposition that the Fourteenth
Amendment redistributed civil rights in this country by sweeping
away state laws that sought to perpetuate the subordination of
African Americans in the post-slavery South. In 1868, the Court in
Crandallv. Nevada6 ' struck down a Nevada statute imposing a capitation tax on every person leaving the state. Two Justices considered
the tax violative of the dormant Commerce Clause, but Justice
Samuel Miller's opinion for the Court reasoned from the general design of the Constitution that citizens ought to be able to travel freely
across state borders. Crandall is an exceedingly easy case under our
model (invalid as a redistributive state policy with large external
costs). It was also a potentially important signaling case, suggesting
the possibility that the Supreme Court would interpret the
Reconstructed Constitution to create a corpus of rights based upon the
concept of national citizenship. And the Court appeared to be heading
58. See William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to
Judicial Doctrine (Harvard U., 1988). The irregular process by which that amendment was
ratified is recounted in Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations(Belknap, 1991).
59. 78 U.S. 113 (1871) (striking down federal income tax applied to salary of state judge),
overruled by Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
60. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1869).
61. 73 U.S. 35 (1867).
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in that direction when it decided Strauder v. West Virginia,62 which
struck down a state law excluding black citizens from juries.
Strauder was a harder case than Crandall (lower righthand rather
than upper righthand quadrant of our state regulation table) and
therefore might have suggested an aggressive stance on the part of
the Court.
Yet the Reconstruction Court fragmented on this issue, with a
majority of the Court after Crandall interpreting the Constitution,
including the Fourteenth Amendment, consistent with Taney Court
precedent protecting local development policies. In The SlaughterHouse Cases,63 a five-Justice majority refused to apply the various
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down a Louisiana
statute vesting a monopoly in one butcher's establishment in the city
of New Orleans. Relying on Miln and dicta in Gibbons, Justice
Miller's opinion for the Court held that health and inspection laws
were classic applications of state police powers that were not altered
by the Reconstruction amendments. Instead, those amendments were
limited to the narrow redistributive goal of integrating African
Americans into national and state citizenship-a goal hardly implicated by state regulation of slaughter houses. Chief Justice Salmon
Chase and Associate Justices Stephen Field, Noah Swayne, and
Joseph Bradley (all but Bradley were Lincoln nominees) dissented,
arguing that economic rights to free trade and to contract were protected against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Court's internal divisions are
consistent with our model, for The Slaughter-House Cases were hard
in the same way that Strauder was (a redistributive policy but with
few external effects, hence the lower righthand quadrant of our state
regulation table). That the Court invalidated the law in Strauderand
upheld it in The Slaughter-HouseCases owes to the different political
reactions of the Justices. More generally, this clash between a
"liberal free labor" ideology held by many of the former abolitionists,
and the more traditional "states' rights republican views" recurred
through the post-Reconstruction Court, with the latter views prevailing during the Chase (1864-73) and Waite (1874-88) Courts.6

62. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
63. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
64. The quoted phraseology is taken from Rogers M. Smith, "One United People"." SecondClass Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community, 1 Yale J. L. & Human. 229,
260 (1989).
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Even on issues of race, the consensus that had marked the
Reconstruction Court dissolved over time, especially after the
"compromise" of 1877, which allowed Republican Rutherford Hayes to
become President after the contested election of 1876 in return for the
end of Reconstruction in the South. The coalition that had enacted
the Reconstruction Amendments and civil rights laws in 1866, 1871,
and 1875 collapsed. Its collapse was immediately echoed by the
Court.65 Justice Bradley's opinion in The Civil Rights Cases66 struck
down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 on the ground that its prohibition of
private discrimination in public accommodations was beyond the
authority of the federal government. The opinion reasoned that the
federal government could only regulate "state action," and not private
action, under its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. As
Justice Harlan pointed out in his lone dissent, this was a distinct
retreat from the ideology that inspired the Reconstruction
Amendments. The Civil Rights Cases reflected the Court's disinclination to create a national forum for further redistribution of political
power to African Americans in the South, as well as the Court's concern that the statute regulated allocative matters (public accommodations) traditionally left to the states. In such circumstances, the
Court would be expected to invalidate the statute under our national
regulation model.
Our model is strikingly illustrated by the Chase Court's most
celebrated volte-face: The Legal Tender Cases. In the first case, decided in 1870,67 the Court by a four (holdover Democrats plus Chase,
who had been a Democrat) to three (Lincoln Republicans) vote invalidated the Legal Tender Act of 1862, which made paper money legal
tender to pay preexisting debts. Since the Contracts Clause was by
its terms inapplicable to federal legislation, Chief Justice Chase
lamely struck down the statute as contrary to the "spirit of the
Constitution" and the Due Process Clause. 8 Evaluating a federal
redistribution statute with which a (narrow) majority of Justices was
For leading cases where the states' rights view prevailed, see Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S.
655 (1874) (Miller, J.); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (holding Fourteenth Amendment
does not ensure women the right to vote); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (opinion of the
Court by Miller, J., with concurring opinion by Bradley, J.) (holding that women do not have a
right to practice law under the Fourteenth Amendment).
65. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (limiting the application of the
Civil Rights Act of 1870 to state action).
66. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also United States v. Harris,106 U.S. 629 (1882) (invalidating
the anti-lynching provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, because not aimed at state action).
67. Hepburnv. Griswold ("The First Legal Tender Case"), 75 U.S. 603 (1869).
68. Id. at 614, 622-24, 626.
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politically suspicious, The First Legal Tender Case fits our model as
an uncertain decision-and one vulnerable to overruling, as the Court
did in 1871 when two new Republican votes on the Court produced
the opposite result by a five (Republicans) to four (Democrats plus
69
Chase) vote.
D. The Lochner Court, 1895-1937
The next major political realignment, in our view, was one in
which the Court led the way, and not one in which a realigning election yielded shifts in the Court. The "free labor" views of the former
abolitionists became the rallying ideology for a generation of state and
federal judges who were shocked by the increasing social polarization
of the post-Civil War industrializing America, a polarization reflected
in acrimonious labor strikes and boycotts, state laws imposing myriad
employment restrictions on small businesses, and a wave of mergers
and trusts that directly threatened their Arcadian vision of America
as a land of striving individuals and small businesses.70
The
Supreme Court was remade by the state-court judges appointed by
Presidents71 Cleveland (1885-89, 1893-97) and Benjamin Harrison
(1889-93).

On federalism issues, these judges in 1895 and 1896 staked
out an ambitious agenda that had the following three features: First,
the federal government should enjoy virtually plenary power to regulate interstate railway transportation, an arena of economic development that required nationwide rather than state-by-state regulation.72

69. Legal Tender Cases, (Knox v. Lee, Parker v. Davis), 79 U.S. 457 (1871). Newly
appointed Justices Strong and Bradley voted to overrule Hepburn.
70. See generally Sidney Fine, Laissez Faire and the General Welfare State (U. of
Michigan, 1956); Arnold Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law: Attitudes of Bar and
Bench, 1887-1895 (Cornell U., 1960); Benjamin Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution: How
Laissez FaireCame to the Supreme Court (Princeton U., 1942).
71. The appointments were Chief Justice Melville Fuller (1888-1910) and Associate
Justices Lucius Lamar (1888-93), David Brewer (1889-1910), Henry Brown (1890-1906), George
Shiras (1892-1903), Howell Jackson (1893-95), Edward White (1894-1921), and Rufus Peckham
(1895-1909).
On the Fuller Court, see generally Owen M. Fiss, Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State,
1888-1910 (Macmillan, 1993) (vol. 8 of the Holmes Devise History); William F. Duker, Mr.
Justice Rufus W. Peckham and the Case of Ex Parte Young- Lochnerizing Munn v. Illinois, 1980
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 539; Alan Westin, The Supreme Court, the PopulistMovement and the Campaign
of 1896, 15 J. Pol. 3 (1953).
72. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (applying
Sherman Act against railroad cartel).
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The most notable case was In re Debs,73 where a unanimous Court
held that the Commerce Clause vested the President and the judiciary
with authority to quash the 1894 Pullman Strike, in order to ensure
the continuing flow of interstate commerce. Debs was a very easy
case, because it involved the exercise of national redistributive and
developmental authority by th6 same political coalition that had appointed most of the Court (automatic validity in the lower lefthand
quadrant of the national regulation table). The existence of federal
regulatory power did not preclude state regulation in some circumstances, and the Court explicitly held that Congress could sanction
state regulation of interstate commerce.7 4
Second, the Court continued to insist that the federal government had no authority to invade the states' autonomy 75 or their local
developmental prerogatives, even under the "pretext" of their established constitutional powers. A divided Court in United States v. E.C.
Knight Co.76 held that the Sherman Act could not be applied to manufacturing as opposed to transportation enterprises, and in Plessy v.
Ferguson77 signaled that the federal government could not interfere
with Southern "Jim Crow" (apartheid) laws enacted after
Reconstruction. Knight, in particular, was a hard case: The Sherman
Act was adopted by the same political coalition that produced most of
the Justices, but the application of the statute to manufacturing
raised the possibility that national legislation was invading state
allocative responsibilities. Hence the case fell into the upper lefthand
quadrant of the national regulation table, an unstable position from
which the Court subsequently retreated.
Third, and most important from the Court's perspective, neither the state nor federal governments had the authority to engage in
"naked" economic redistribution from the "haves" to the "have nots."
This was the premise under which the Court reviewed rate determinations by state regulatory bodies 7s and, in cases like Lochner, struck
down state laws depriving people of their "liberty of contract. ''79 It
73. 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (Brewer, J.).
74. In re Rahrer,140 U.S. 545 (1891).
75. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (granting expansive interpretation of Eleventh Amendment to prevent lawsuits against states).
76. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
77. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
78. Reagan v. Farmers'Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 399 (1894). See Ames v. Union
Pac.Ry. Co., 64 F. 165, 170 (C.C.D. Neb. 1894) (Brewer, J., sitting on circuit duty) (invalidating
state law prescribing local freight rates on railroads).
79. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), and later Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905).
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was also the underlying premise of The Income Tax Case,80 which
struck down the federal income tax as a direct tax in violation of
Article I's requirement that such taxes be apportioned among the
states. The Income Tax Case was an unusually hard national power
case under our model: It involved a redistributive statute of the sort
that the Chase Court had upheld,81 and it was enacted as part of the
economic program of President Grover Cleveland, who had appointed
three of the sitting Justices, including Chief Justice Fuller, who wrote
the opinion for the Court. On the other hand, the income tax was
precisely the sort of "radically" redistributive legislation that archconservative Justices Stephen Field and David Brewer deplored, and the
Cleveland Administration's Attorney General Richard Olney presented only a half-hearted defense of the statute. The case could have
gone either way, in our view, and in fact did go every which way: The
initial vote was a four-to-four deadlock; on rehearing, the nonvoting
ninth Justice voted to sustain the tax, meaning that one of the
82
Justices originally voting to sustain changed his mind.
These aggressive moves by the federal judiciary were a major
campaign issue in the presidential election of 1896, in which the
Democratic Party renounced the stand-pat policies of its sitting
President (Cleveland) and vigorously attacked Debs, E.C. Knight, and
The Income Tax Case in its platform and on the campaign trail. That
the Democrats lost the election, and elected only one President
(Wilson) between 1896 and 1928, represented a realignment in
American politics around the position staked out by the Court in
1895-96. For once in American history, the election returns followed,
rather than preceded, the Court's actions. The Fuller Court's liberty
of contract agenda had a profound effect on American federalism. The
most important inroad on state power was the Court's decision in Ex
parte Young, 83 in which the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment,
which bars lawsuits directly against the states in federal courts, did
80. Pollock v. Farmers'Loan& Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 599 (1895) (Field, J., concurring);
David Brewer, The Income Tax Cases and Some Comments Thereon (address June 8, 1898)
(Brewer Papers, Yale U., Doc. 3-142).
81. See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869) (upholding federal income tax adopted

during Civil War).
82.

Democrat Justice Howell Jackson (appointed by Republican President Harrison, how-

ever) did not participate in the first round of voting, because of ill health. He did participate in
the second round and voted for the tax-yet the Court still split five-to-four against the tax.
This meant that one of the original supporters of the tax changed his vote. We go with the
conventional wisdom that it was the muddy-headed Republican Justice George Shiras, perhaps
browbeaten into submission by Justices Field and Brewer.
83. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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not bar a lawsuit to enjoin a state official from enforcing confiscatory
(and presumably other unconstitutional) state policies. The Court
repeatedly upheld applications of the Interstate Commerce Act to
intrastate commerce,8 4 and applied the Sherman Act to interstate
labor boycotts in Loewe v. Lawlor. 5
These were easy cases
(redistributive or national development policies reflecting political
preferences similar to the Court's), in contrast to Young, which was
hard because it imposed substantial burdens on the states' ability to
carry out their traditional police powers, as Justice Harlan argued in
another of his solo dissents.
On other federalism issues, the Court fragmented badly over
time, because of disagreements within the freedom of contract coalition over the authority of government (state or federal) to engage in
specific redistributive policies. The leading state case was Lochner v.
New York, 88 in which a five-to-four Fuller Court majority struck down
a state law fixing maximum hours that bakers could work. The main
Commerce Clause decision, The Lottery Case,87 was decided two years
before. A different five-Justice majority upheld an 1895 federal statute prohibiting the sending of lottery tickets through the mails or
interstate. Four Justices (three of whom were part of the Lochner
majority) dissented, on the ground that the ostensible regulation of
"commerce" was merely a pretext for substantive regulation of morals
that was left to the states. The Court followed The Lottery Case in
upholding federal regulation of bad food, sex, and booze,88 but sometimes declined to follow that precedent when the federal regulation
trenched upon liberty of contract concerns. Thus, the Court in Adair
v. United States89 overturned the federal law prohibiting 'yellow dog"
railway contracts (i.e., prohibiting workers from joining unions), in
part because the law was not within Congress' Commerce Clause

84. See Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234
U.S. 342 (1914) (holding that the ICC could prohibit railroads from charging discriminatory
intrastate rates, because of effect on interstate commerce); Southern RR. Co. v. United States,
222 U.S. 20 (1911) (upholding regulation of defective railroad couplers, even intrastate).
85. 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (drawing from Debs the precept that the Sherman Act applied to
labor unions).
86. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
87. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
88. See Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917) (holding
that Congress can regulate interstate transport of liquor); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470 (1917) (reading interstate transportation of women for "immoral purposes" to include
extramarital sex); Hoke and Economides v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (regarding
prostitution); HipoliteEgg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (regarding impure food and
drugs).
89. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
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power, though Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court started with the
proposition that such laws violated the liberty of contract precepts of
Lochner.90
A five-Justice majority in Hammer v. Dagenhart91
invalidated the federal child labor law. The Court labored to
distinguish The Lottery Case and precedents following it. All of these
were ambiguous cases, The Lottery Case because the federal statute
regulated a traditional state function (morals), and Adair and
Hammer because they were redistribution and development policy
cases. Yet the first case upheld the federal lottery law because it was
consistent with the Court's puritan ideology, and the latter two cases
struck down federal labor regulations in tension with the Court's
liberty of contract politics.
The coalition that reigned during the Fuller Court (1888-1910)
ran out of gas during the White Court (1910-21), but ruled again after
the election of Warren Harding as President in 1920. Because of
conservative appointments during the Era of Normalcy, the Taft
(1921-30) and early Hughes (1930-41) Courts witnessed a resurgence
in the liberty of contract ideology.9 2 The Normalcy Court was suspi-

cious of both state and federal regulatory legislation. The modern
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence began to take form in this
period. In Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,93 the Court invalidated a
West Virginia statute requiring in-state gas pipelines to meet local
gas needs before exporting West Virginia gas to out-of-staters. This is
an ambiguous case under our model, because the state policy was
generally allocative or developmental but had significant external
effects, placing it in the upper righthand quadrant of our state regulation table (no clear prediction).
The Normalcy Court is not best known for its dormant
Commerce Clause decisions, however, but instead for a series of
fiercely contested decisions striking down New Deal statutes as be90. Id. at 172-73, 179-80. See also Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1915) (striking
down 6-3 the state prohibition of yellow dog contracts as a naked redistribution of power to
unions).
91. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
92. A voting block, the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, ensured liberty of contract pressure in every case. Two of the Horsemen, Willis VanDevanter (1910-37) and James
MacReynolds (1914-41), were appointed before the Era of Normalcy. The other two Horsemen,
George Sutherland (1922-38) and Pierce Butler (1922-39), were appointed through the connivance of Taft in the 1920s.
On the Taft Court, see generally Alpheus Mason, William Howard Taft: Chief Justice
(Simon & Schuster, 1964); Robert M. Cover, Taft Court (1921-1930), in Levy, et al., eds., 4
Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 1849 (cited in note 26).
93. 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
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yond Congress' Commerce Clause powers. 94 Perhaps the most significant case was Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 95 in which a divided (six-tothree) Court invalidated the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act's
regulation of maximum hours and minimum wages in coal mines.
Carter is a hard case under our model, because it involves a developmental or redistributive statute reflecting different political values
from those held by the liberty-of-contract Court, hence placing it in
the lower righthand quadrant of our national regulation table. This
and other New Deal statutes were struck down by the "old" Normalcy
Court, but, consistent with our model, other New Deal statutes in the
96
lower righthand quadrant were upheld.
E. The New Deal Court, 1937-86
The liberty of contract philosophy of the Lochner era was repudiated at the polls in 1932 and 1936, when Franklin Roosevelt and the
Democratic Party won sweeping victories. Roosevelt's New Deal ran
into trouble with the old Court, as recounted above, and that triggered the crisis of 1937, in which Roosevelt's proposal to expand the
Court's membership triggered a firestorm of protest but coincided
with the Court's own overtures to the New Deal's regulatory measures. 97 In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,98 a five-to-four
majority of the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act's regulation of unfair labor practices. Contrary to Dagenhart and other
precedents, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes' opinion for the
Court upheld substantive labor regulation on the ground that it
"affected" commerce. Like Carter,Jones & Laughlin is a hard case
under our typology, falling in the lower righthand quadrant of the
national regulation table. It is hard to tell exactly what distinguishes

94. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act by a vote of 6-3); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating the
Agricultural Adjustment Act); RailroadRetirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935)
(invalidating the Railroad Retirement Act by a 5-4 decision). See also Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act, with
some fragmentation as to rationale, by a unanimous vote).
95. 298 U.S. 238.
96. See Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (upholding joint reso-

lution declaring "gold clauses" in private contracts to be "against public policy"); Perry v. United
States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) (holding, by a divided Court, that United States could void public
obligations to redeem in gold).
97. See generally James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox ch. 15
(Harcourt, 1956); William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelts "CourtPackingPlan," 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 347.
98. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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Carter (statute invalid) from Jones & Laughlin (statute upheld), beyond the increasing pressure on the Court to bend to the New Deal.
Although doctrinal stories can be concocted to reconcile the various
cases, our model lends support to theories positing that the Court's
"switch in time" was politically rather than doctrinally motivated. 99
The Court's switch in time averted a constitutional showdown
between the Court and the political system, and between 1937 and
1943 Roosevelt remade the Court with nine nominees.100 The immediate agenda of the New Deal Court was to interpret the Commerce
Clause broadly enough to embrace regulatory legislation with incidental (but demonstrable) effects on interstate commerce, and with this
the coalition consolidated the new Commerce Clause jurisprudence

02
with unanimous majorities by 1942.101 In United States v. Darby,

for example, the Court overruled Hammer and Carter and upheld the
Fair Labor Standards Act regulation of hours, wages, and other conditions of employment. Darby is an easy case under our model, because
the federal development and redistribution statute reflected New
Deal political values with which the New Deal Court was completely
comfortable. Darby falls within the lower lefthand quadrant of our
national regulation table, where statutes are always upheld.
The larger agenda of the New Deal Court was to rethink federalist premises in light of the emerging regulatory state. The Court's
rethinking is consistent with our theory of federalism. On the one
hand, the Court reaffirmed the authority of the states to engage in
efficient allocation and development policies without federal interference. In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,10 3 for example, the Court
overruled Swift v. Tyson to require federal courts in diversity
jurisdiction cases to apply state law rather than federal common law.
Justice Louis Brandeis' justification for the overruling rested mainly
on constitutional federalism, suggesting that neither Congress nor the

99. This is the majority view, recently challenged in Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New
Deal Court, 80 Va. L. Rev. 201 (1994), and also recently given a fascinating new historical spin
in Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 620 (1994).
100. Roosevelt elevated Justice Harlan Stone to Chief Justice (1941-46) and appointed as
Associate Justices Hugo Black (1937-71), Stanley Reed (1938-57), Felix Frankfurter (1939-62),
William Douglas (1939-75), Frank Murphy (1940-49), James Byrnes (1941-42), Robert Jackson
(1941-54), and Wiley Rutledge (1943-49).
101. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941) (two unanimous decisions that substantially expanded Congress' Commerce Clause
powers).
102. 312 U.S. 100.
103. 304 U.S. 64.
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Court had the authority to displace state law in such a global manner.
Additionally, the New Deal Court developed rules of statutory interpretation to reconcile state allocation and development policies with
new federal development and redistribution statutes. As the Court
said in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., courts must "start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."104 We would interpret this rule to mean that
national laws will normally not trump state allocation and development policies unless the latter undermine needs for national uniformity, impose costs outside the state, or reflect the dysfunctions of the
race to the bottom and other prisoner's dilemma games.
On the other hand, the New Deal Court vigorously developed
our model's themes for the assertion of national regulation. The
United States economy was a national one in ways it had not been
before the Lochner era, characterized by industry-wide labor unions
and manufacturing oligopolies, national stock and commodity exchanges, coast-to-coast markets even for perishable goods, and so
forth.105

The Depression had indicated the need for federal rather

than just state-by-state regulation of these increasingly nationalized
(and transnationalized) features of the economy. Starting with Jones
& Laughlin, the new Court repeatedly sanctioned these national
development policies, though carefully preserving state prerogatives
to pursue local development objectives as well.
More important, this was a period of vigorous state regulation,
and the Court was called upon to monitor externalities imposed by
state regulation on the national market. The Court's dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence received its mature development in
this period. The New Deal Court sought to draw the fine line between
primarily local legislation, and laws excessively burdening interstate
commerce. Chief Justice Harlan Stone led the way in his opinion for
the Court in South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell
Brothers, 06 which upheld South Carolina's law prohibiting trucks
more than ninety inches wide or weighing more than 20,000 pounds.
Stone characterized the law as a standard safety measure (allocation)
having modest external effects; this had the effect of situating the

104. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). For leading recent statements, see Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2608 (1992); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
105. See Gardiner Means, The Structure of the American Economy (Natural Resources
Committee, 1939).
106. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
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state statute in the lower lefthand quadrant of our state regulation
table, where regulations are always upheld. But Stone anticipated
features of our theory when he warned that "[sitate regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose purpose or effect is to gain for those
within the state an advantage at the expense of those without" might
be unconstitutional.17 "Underlying the stated rule has been the
thought... that when the regulation is of such a character that its
burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are
normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state.'10 8 Stone reached a different result seven years
later, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,09 which struck down a state
prohibition of railroad trains of more than fourteen passenger or
seventy freight cars. Although this too was a safety measure by the
state (albeit one that struck the Court as minimal), Stone found that
it imposed extraordinary externalities on the interstate
transportation system-thereby securing for the Arizona law a spot in
the upper lefthand quadrant of our state regulation table (result
unclear). Consistent with that placement, the Court was divided in
Southern Pacific.
Issues of redistribution inevitably found their way to national
politics, and the New Deal Court upheld federal statutes redistributing wealth through a system of social security and welfare," 0 and
social power through a string of civil rights laws."' The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was passed under Congress' Commerce Clause powers,
and the Court unanimously applied it to situations having very little
connection with interstate commerce in Katzenbach v. McClung,"1 the
famous "Ollie's Barbecue" case. Because this was a redistributional
statute whose political values reflected those held by the Warren
Court, McClung was an easy case, falling under the lower lefthand
quadrant of our national regulation table.

107. Id. at 184 n.2.
108. Id. at 185 n.2.
109. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
110. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) and Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding Social Security Act).
111. The (Second) New Deal and the Great Society were the occasions for major welfare
legislation. Civil rights statutes were enacted in 1957, 1961, 1964, 1965, and 1968, with important amendments added in the 1970s and 1980s.
112. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). See also Heartof Atlanta Hotel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964).
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The New Deal Court enjoyed a relatively long period of internal harmony on federalism issues, especially as they related to national market regulation and civil rights. That consensus dissolved
over several issues prominent in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For
example, the Court's consensus that the Commerce Clause justified
the 1964 Civil Rights Act evanesced when the Court was faced with
civil rights laws enacted under authority of the Reconstruction
Amendments. A majority of the Court partially overruled The Civil
Rights Cases' limitations on Congress' authority to implement the
Reconstruction amendments, but dissenting opinions made powerful
13
historical arguments.
Also divisive within the Court was the dormant Commerce
Clause issue, with some Justices strenuously objecting to the Court's
open balancing of local and national interests to overturn state
development policies.
For example, in Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp.,1 4 a badly divided Court struck down Iowa's regulation of truck lengths. The key distinctions between Kassel and
Barnwell were that in the former case the Court found very substantial externalities resulting from the state safety rule, externalities
that state law ameliorated for in-state users, placing the Iowa law
squarely in the upper (rather than lower) lefthand quadrant.
Moreover, as two concurring Justices argued, there was some intimation that Iowa's truck-length policy was in some way redistributive
(protecting Iowa truckers at the expense of out-of-staters), and not
just a pure safety measure." 5 In other decisions as well, the Court
has actively enforced our model's suggestion that state laws having
significant external effects will either be struck down (if apparently
redistributive) or subject to serious challenge (if serving only domestic
policies)." 6 This was the Court's approach in Edgar v. MITE
113. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (giving expansive interpreta-

tion of Fifteenth Amendment, with two Justices concurring in separate opinions and three
Justices dissenting); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (giving expansive inter-

pretation of Thirteenth Amendment, with two justices dissenting); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641 (1966) (giving expansive interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment, over dissent of two

Justices).
114. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
115. Id. at 681-82 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). This would tend to move
Kassel into the upper righthand quadrant of our state regulation table, where legislation is
always invalidated. Since the Court plurality did not accept this analysis, we shall not insist on
this point, though.
116. See, for example, Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978)
(invalidating trucking regulation because it imposed excessive costs on commerce); Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (invalidating state rule requiring
Washington apple growers to follow less stringent USDA labeling rules, so that Washington
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Corp.,117 in which the Court struck down an Illinois statute
regulating corporate take-overs.
The statute was a classic
allocational one, but with significant external effects because of the
interstate nature of corporate take-overs-thereby putting the case in
the upper righthand quadrant of our state regulation table. This
suggests that MITE was a tough case, and indeed the Court
splintered badly."5
Not all dormant Commerce Clause cases have been so difficult
as Kassel and MITE. In City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey,119 the
Court invalidated a New Jersey law prohibiting the importation of
waste material into the state. Though this was ostensibly an
allocational safety and health measure, it was vulnerable because it
imposed major externalities on neighboring states and cities (like
Philadelphia). Indeed, there was some indication that the New Jersey
law was a rank effort to redistribute benefits from these states to its
own residents, raising many constitutional red flags, and moving the
state law into the upper righthand quadrant of our state regulation
table, where laws are always invalidated.
In contrast to the
controversial decisions in Kassel and MITE, the Court's decision in
City of Philadelphiahas been rejected only by Justice Rehnquist on
the current Court.120
The hardest federalism issues raised by the modern regulatory
state relate to the integrity of state government, and the legitimacy of
national intrusions into core governmental functions. The Court's
willingness to adjudicate unequal state representation issues was
strenuously resisted by Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Baker v.

apples would lose some of their competitive advantage for quality); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137 (1970) (invalidating law requiring cantaloupes sold in Arizona to be packed in
Arizona crates). Of course, many state rules (in the lower quadrants) survive dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny. See, for example, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456 (1981) (upholding local milk container rule that does not have substantial burden on interstate commerce).
117. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
118. Three justices (White, Burger, Blackmun) considered the Illinois statute preempted by
federal law; six justices (the above three, plus Powell, Stevens, O'Connor) considered the statute
in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause; three justices (Brennan, Marshall, Rehnquist)

considered the case moot.
119. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
120. Id. at 629 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist also dissented in later cases applying
that precedent. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2017 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Fort Gratiot SanitaryLandfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept of Natural
Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2028 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Carr,121 for example. In the most befuddled case, the Court fractured
badly in Oregon v. Mitchell,122 which adjudicated 1970 amendments to
the Voting Rights Act. The Court unanimously upheld the statute's
suspension of literacy tests as a prerequisite to voting but split on the
statute's lowering the miniumum voting age to eighteen in state and
national elections. Justice Black concluded that this rule was
constitutional for national elections, but not for state elections. Four
Justices agreed with Black on the first point, and a different four
Justices agreed with him on the second, making his single vote the
judgment of the Court. We would treat Mitchell as a case falling in
the upper lefthand quadrant of our national regulation table, making
it a hard and unpredictable case, as the split within the Court
confirmed.
The thorniest federalism issue of the period was the authority
of Congress to impose regulatory obligations directly on the states.
The early New Deal Court had established that state and federal
governments could tax federal and state employees, respectively, so
long as the burdens did not discriminate against such employees.123
The New Deal regulatory measures, such as labor regulations, did not
apply to state governments, and the early New Deal Court believed
that the states themselves could not be directly taxed. 124 This consensus changed in response to new federal laws imposing direct regulations on the states; the Court's response was chaotic. In Maryland v.
Wirtz, 5r a divided Court upheld amendments to the Fair Labor

Standards Act which extended minimum wage and maximum hour
rules to employees of states, their political subdivisions, and state
enterprises. Eight years later, a five-to-four Court majority overruled
Wirtz and held in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery 26 that the federal
government could not directly regulate or burden "integral government functions" of the states. 27 Nine years after that, a different fiveto-four majority overruled NationalLeague of Cities in Garcia v. San

121. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding state apportionment disputes to be 'justiciable," with
three Justices writing separate concurring opinions and Justices Frankfurter and Harlan
dissenting).
122. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
123. See Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (upholding state income tax on federal
employees); Helvering v. Gerhardt,304 U.S. 405 (1938) (upholding federal income tax on state
employees).
124. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 586 (1946) (Stone, C.J., concurring).
125. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
126. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
127. Id. at 851-52.
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Antonio MetropolitanTransit Authority.128 That the Court would fracture so badly in these cases is consistent with our model. Although
wage and hour laws like the FLSA are developmental and redistributive (Darby), their application to the states themselves might implicate the states' ability to perform their basic police power (allocative)
functions. In that event, the statute is within the upper lefthand
quadrant of our national regulation table, which yields no certain
prediction. The issue is genuinely hard, as illustrated by the Supreme
Court's waffles.
F. The Reagan Court, 1986-?
We share the doubts of political scientists who are uncertain as
to whether there has been a critical election since 1932. For our purposes, the most plausible candidate would be Reagan's election in
1980, which has certainly produced important effects on the Supreme
Court and federalism, even if it may not have reformed the political
landscape as profoundly as earlier electoral transformations. As the
Burger Court's wild peregrinations from National League of Cities to
Garcia suggest, there was no consensus even among the Nixon-appointed Justices about the hard federalism issues (Justice Blackmun
didn't even enjoy a personal consensus during this period). There
appears to be a new consensus on some federalism issues among the
six Justices appointed during the Reagan-Bush administrations.129
The Reagan Court's consensus does not question the broad
contours of the New Deal Court's federalism jurisprudence. Thus, the
Reagan Court has not yet questioned the New Deal Court's broad
reading of the Commerce Clause and in South Dakota v. Dole'30 interpreted the Spending Clause to allow the national government to do
indirectly (by withholding money to states refusing to follow regualtory conditions) what it could not directly accomplish under its
Commerce Clause powers. Nor does the Reagan Court question the
128. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The key development was that Justice Blackmun (who concurred
separately in National League of Cities and wrote the opinion for the Court in Garcia)changed
his vote. See also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (upholding federal rules severely
burdening states with 5-4 split Court).
129. Namely, Justice William Rehnquist as Chief Justice (1986), and Sandra Day O'Connor
(1981), Antonin Scalia (1986), Anthony Kennedy (1988), David Souter (1990), and Clarence
Thomas (1991). Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg (1993) and Stephen Breyer (1994) have been
appointed by Democrat President Clinton and may or may not share some of the federalism
views of the Reagan-Bush appointees.
130. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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now traditional use of the dormant Commerce Clause to regulate costexporting state and local discriminations against interstate
commerce. 131 On the other hand, the Court is much less likely to
strike down state rules that are on their face not discriminatory but
2 for
which have external effects. In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.,"3
example, the Court upheld an Indiana take-over statute, politely
distinguishing MITE. That both CTS and MITE reviewed allocative
statutes having external effects (upper lefthand quadrant of the state
regulation table) is consistent with our model, which suggests no clear
prediction for these cases.
The most important move of the Reagan Court has been to
protect the integrity of state governments against federal encroachment. Although the early Rehnquist Court upheld federal taxation of
state bonds in South Carolina v. Baker, 33 later decisions have revealed a stronger constitutional approach. All six Reagan-Bush
Justices joined Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's opinion for the Court
in New York v. United States,13 which invalidated that part of a 1985
federal statute requiring states to "take title" to radioactive wastes in
their jurisdiction, and take responsibility for damages flowing from it,
if they failed to provide for its disposal by 1996. Justice O'Connor
objected to this requirement as "coercing" the states to be the
instruments for the federal government's regulatory policy-incurring
the costs without having any say in the policy itself. New York
represents a more vigorous protection of state autonomy than Garcia
and draws inspiration instead from O'Connor's opinion in Gregory v.
Ashcroft,"3S which contains an elegy for the virtues of federalism.
Rather tentatively, we would place New York in the upper lefthand
quadrant of our national regulation table, where prediction is
uncertain, because the Court's opinion exhibited a hostility to the
statutory policy of "coercion."
Gregory reflects the Reagan Court's most original contribution
to federalism. The case involved the applicability of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to prevent states from
131. See, for example, Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992); Chemical
Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. 2009.
132. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
133. 485 U.S. 505 (1988). Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court relied on Garcia,which

was disavowed by concurring Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. Justice O'Connor
dissented. Newly appointed Justice Kennedy did not participate. Hence all four of the thenReagan Justices refused to join Brennan's core analysis. Three of the five Justices who unreservedly joined the Brennan opinion have left the Court.
134. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
135. 501 U.S. 452.
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imposing mandatory retirement ages on their judges. Under traditional canons of statutory interpretation, the answer was probably,
"no." But O'Connor's opinion, joined by all five of the (then) ReaganBush Justices and none of the previously appointed Justices, started
with a different baseline: "[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garciahas left
primarily to the political process the protection of the States against
intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be
absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise.136 Hence,
O'Connor announced that the Court would require a manifestly clear
statement by Congress before it would interpret a statute to apply to
core state functions of governance. Her "super-strong clear statement
rule" is similar to one the Court has crafted before it will fmd a congressional abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity,13 7
and just a bit stronger than the Court's presumptions against finding
implied conditions on federal funding of state programs,'3 against
application of federal criminal statutes to disrupt local political processes, 139 and against constructions of federal antitrust statutes to
14
apply to local politics. 0

The Reagan Justices are also poised to adjust federal regulatory power under both the Commerce Clause and the Reconstruction
Amendments. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,'41 a divided Court
held that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to
abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, so long as the abrogation is manifestly clear on the face of the statute. Significantly, all
four of the Reagan Justices then on the Court dissented; three of the
majority Justices have left the Court since 1989, casting some doubt
on Congress' power in this area. A similarly divided Court (again,
with all four Reagan Justices in dissent) upheld federal power to
establish affirmative action requirements for broadcast licensing in
2 Again, with new Reagan Justices
Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC.14
now on the Court, it is not clear what will become of expansive con136. Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
137. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40 (1985), followed in Blatchford
v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village, 501 U.S. 775 (1991); Hoffman v. ConnecticutDep't
ofIncome Maintenance,492 U.S. 96, 101 (1989); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989).
138. PennhurstState School & Hosp. v. Halderman,451 U.S. 1, 22-26 (1981).
139. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987); McCormick v. United States,
500 U.S. 257, 286 n.6 (1991).
140. City of Columbiav. Omni OutdoorAdvertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379 (1991). See also
Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 333 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing for
broad construction of Sherman Act's interstate commerce requirement).
141. 491 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1989).
142. 497 U.S. 547, 600-01 (1990).
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gressional power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. A harbinger may be Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Shaw v.
Reno, 43 which held that race-based gerrymandering required by the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, could nonetheless violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Five of the six Reagan-Bush Justices joined her
opinion.
III. REVISITING OUR MODEL OF FEDERALISM LIMITS ON
NATIONAL AND STATE REGULATION

Reconsider our model of national regulation in light of the brief
history presented above. We start by filling in our national regulation
table with the actual results of our survey. Table Three reports those
results.
The two predictions in our model held perfectly well: All the
decisions in the upper righthand quadrant invalidated federal laws,
and all in the lower lefthand quadrant upheld federal laws. Note the
two instances in which the Court changed its mind, in one instance
after one hundred years (Swift to Erie) and in the other after just one
(FirstLegal Tender Cases to Second).
In cases of significant ideological divergence between the Court
and the current Congress (the righthand quadrants), the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to give expansive interpretations of congressional powers. We are both impressed and surprised by the cases
arrayed in the righthand quadrants. We are impressed that not only
do all the decisions in the upper righthand quadrant strike down
federal intrusions, but that there are so few of them. We are surprised that almost all the cases in the lower righthand quadrant
(where we made no predictions) invalidated national legislation.
Comparing the righthand and lefthand sides of Table Three, we now
hypothesize that the primary determinant of Supreme Court evaluation of congressional legislation is inspired by political values. On
the other hand, in light of the pattern of some invalidations in the
upper lefthand quadrant, our findings support the further hypothesis
that the Court does, secondarily, enforce federalism values. In addition, we note that the pattern suggested by Gregory and Rice (federal
statutes will be narrowly construed, to avoid interfering with the

143. 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2831 (1993).
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states' allocative responsibilities)'4 provides explicit and very important further protection for state interests against federal encorachment.
Table Three
A Classification of Commerce Clause Cases

Court Ideology Near
That of Enacting
Congress

Court Ideology
Different from
Congress

High
Burden on

Swift (invalid)
Knight (invalid)
Ex Parte Young (valid)
Lottery Cases (valid)

Erie (invalid)
Civil Rights Cases (invalid)
New York (invalid)

Core State

Mitchell (invalid)

Functions

NLC (invalid)
Garcia (valid)
S. Carolina(valid)
S .Dakota (valid)
Union Gas (valid)
Gregory (invalid)

Low Burden
on Core
State

Functions

Gibbons (valid)
McCulloch (valid)
Second Legal Tender
Cases (valid)
Debs (valid)
Loewe (valid)
Darby(valid)
McClung (valid)

Dred Scott (invalid)
FirstLegal Tender
Cases (invalid)
Income Tax Case (invalid)
Adair (invalid)
Hammer (invalid)
Carter(invalid)
Jones & Laughlin (valid)

We now fill in the state regulation table with the results of our
historical survey. Table Four reports those results.
144. For a more extensive analysis of the many canons of interpretation that protect federalism values, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, QuasiConstitutionalLaw: Clear Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593
(1992).
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Table Four
A Classification of Dormant Commerce Clause Cases

Significant
External Effects
on Nonresidents

Insignificant or
Corrigible
External Effects
on Nonresidents

Allocative or
Developmental
Policy

Redistributive
Policy

Gibbons (invalid)
Miln (valid)
Pennsylvania (invalid)
Southern Pacific
(invalid)
MITE (invalid)
Kassel (invalid)
CTS (valid)

Crandall(invalid)
City of
Philadelphia(invalid)

Black Bird (valid)
Cooley (valid)
Barnwell (valid)

Slaughter-House
Cases (valid)
Strauder(invalid)

Again, the two predictions made in our model hold firmly: State redistributive policies with externalities (upper righthand quadrant)
will always be struck down, while state allocative or distributional
policies with few externalities (lower lefthand quadrant) will always
be upheld.
We are most impressed with the upper quadrants, for they
suggest that the key factor in the Court's evaluation of state policy
under the dormant Commerce Clause is whether the policy imposes
external effects on residents of other states who are not well-represented in the state political process. We emphasize here that what
matters is the Court's perception of external effects: What distinguishes cases like Miln, Barnwell and CTS (valid) from Southern
Pacific, Kassel and MITE (invalid) is that the factual record reviewed
by the Court was replete with evidence of substantial external effects
in the latter cases but not in the former. A case like Cooley might be
decided differently today, because the city's requirement of local pilots
might be shown to interfere with interstate shipping, just as the
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statutes in Kassel and Southern Pacific were shown to interfere with
interstate trucking and rail transportation, respectively.
CONCLUSION: FEDERALISM AND THE COMMITMENT ISSUE

We have not offered a complete theory of federalism but have
put forward a structural account of judicial enforcement of federalism
norms. A complete theory would explain the actions of the legislature, the executive, and the states in explaining variation and stability in federal boundaries. Our theory is structural in that it says that
courts have both principled and pragmatic reasons to defer to expansive congressional interpretations of its Commerce Clause authority,
while policing rather more vigorously state actions that trespass on
their neighbors or on constitutional values. This theory, while primarily descriptive rather than normative, owes much to constitutional conservatives such as Weschler, who emphasize the self-policing features of the U.S. Constitution. We do not point to these features to justify judicial restraint in the federalism area, but to provide
part of an explanation for the pattern of judicial enforcement of federalism. We should also note that because it is a structural theory, our
account is not tied to any particular constitutional clause. We might
have chosen to focus on the Contract Clause, Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, or the Due Process Clause, and developed a
similar explanation. Indeed, we regard ourselves as committed to the
truth of such detailed accounts.
This theory, to the extent that it is borne out in the United
States and elsewhere, suggests that courts might be counted on to
monitor or police violations of federal understandings quite unevenly.
Specifically, national courts are unlikely to have either the desire
(because judges believe that states are adequately represented in the
Congress so that congressional actions take state interests into
account, and because new appointments tend to align judicial and
congressional policy preferences) or the opportunity (because of their
political vulnerability to the more popular branches at the national
level) to restrain sustained congressional assertions of authority over
the states. If the Framers of new federalisms in other countries wish
to assure the credibility of a federal agreement, therefore, they would
be wise to design their constitutional structures to be self-enforcing as
far as possible. Reliance on judicial oversight by politically subordi-
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nate judges to check determined efforts by the other branches of the
national government to trample federalism norms seems naive.
The American experience suggests that the key to restraining
the other branches is to design constitutional structures to make it
difficult for them to agree among themselves. Require supermajorities, bicameral agreement, and presentment; stagger election times;
restrain the development of coherent national parties; etc. These
familiar techniques accomplish the twin purposes of making
congressional assertions of authority relatively rare and simultaneously decreasing the vulnerability of the Court to the other
branches. By making congressional restraint relatively likely, there
is less need to rely on courts to restrain congressional action. Indeed,
we think it is impossible to understand the "exceptionalism" of
American history without remarking on the relative timidity of
Congress with respect to federal institutions and practices. 145
We suggest that constitutionally undermining the capacity of
the other branches to reach agreement provides the Court the opportunity, on occasion, to oppose legislative majorities. And in fact, we
have seen that occasionally the Court has read the Commerce Clause
narrowly, most recently in the New York decision. Often judicial
motivation for such action is ideological, as in Hammer, Carter Coal,
and Dred Scott, but sometimes, as in National League of Cities and
Gregory, more principled reasoning probably motivated the result.
Whatever the motivation, these occasions are rare and transient at
best, and are unsustainable against a unified Congress, as in Ex Parte
McCardle or West Coast Hotel.
However, when it comes to policing abuses by subnational
units, the federal courts might be counted on to do a more consistent
job. Our evidence, even though unsystematic, suggests that the Court
has been fairly consistent in restraining states from abusing the interests of nonresidents and, though the record here is not as clear,
trespassing widely shared constitutional values. The key idea here, of
course, is identifying what constitutes a widely shared constitutional
value. Evidently, for most of our history, civil rights for women and
minorities did not count, nor did the rights of slaves in the antebellum
period, and neither does abortion currently. Without broad popular
and legislative support for a particular constitutional value, the Court
145. Nowhere is this phenomenon better illustrated than in American social policy which,
in contrast with European welfare states, is extraordinarily fragmented. For a recent account
see generally Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social

Policy in the United States (Harvard U., 1992).
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cannot be counted on to do a very good job in redeeming this kind of
federal promise.
For federalism to be a credible and therefore an attractive
political solution in pluralistic societies, political institutions must be
so constructed so that nationalizing forces are politically rather than
judicially restrained. It is too much to hope that courts can stand in
the way of popular institutions bent on suborning subnational units.
National courts are rather a better bet when it comes to policing the
subunits themselves, even if these subunits are quite politically powerful. In such cases all of the subunits whose actions are not being
challenged frequently share an interest in judicial action. We can see
already in the brief history of the European Community quite assertive actions by the European Court of Justice in restraining member
states from dumping costs on nonresidents. The political conditions
for such court actions are structurally favorable (nonresidents of a
given state are both numerous and respresented in those institutions
in a position to control the ECJ), and so its occurrence is unsurprising.

